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DOES RULE 41(d) AUTHORIZE AN AWARD
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES?
EDWARD X. CLINTON, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the
dismissal of actions, with subsection (a) governing voluntary
dismissals.! Rule 41(d) applies where a plaintiff voluntarily
dismisses a case in one jurisdiction and then refiles the same or
similar case in another jurisdiction.2 The Rule allows the defen-
dant, once the case has been refiled in another jurisdiction, to re-
cover the costs associated with defending a previously dismissed
action.3 The Rule is designed to discourage plaintiffs from forum
shopping and to compensate defendants for expenses incurred in
defending the same case twice.4
" Litigation associate with the Chicago law firm of Katten, Muchin & Zavis. The
views reflected herein are those of the author, not necessarily those of Katten,
Muchin & Zavis or its clients.
1 Rule 41(a) provides for voluntary dismissals by the plaintiff or by order of the
court. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a). Rule 41(a)(1) allows a plaintiff to dismiss "Without order
of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse
party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or
(ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action." Id.
2 Id. § 41(d). Rule 41(d) provides that:
If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any court commences an
action based upon or including the same claim against the same defendant,
the court may make such order for the payment of costs of the action pre-
viously dismissed as it may deem proper and may stay the proceedings in
the action until the plaintiff has complied with the order.
Id. I The costs awarded under the Rule are determined according to the "continuing
value" test. Under this test, a defendant can only recover costs for "the preparation
of work product rendered useless by the dismissal of [plaintiffs previous action]."
Esquivel v. Arau, 913 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (alteration in original)
(quoting Koch v. Hankins, 8 F.3d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1993)). A defendant cannot re-
cover for work which continues to have value in the second forum. The test ensures
that the amount awarded is narrowly tailored to compensate the defendant for extra
costs incurred by the shift in forums.
4 See 5 JAMEs W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 91 41.16 (2d ed.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Recently, courts have split on the issue of whether the Rule
allows an award of attorney's fees. Most courts that have ad-
dressed the issue have held that fees may be awarded.5 A minor-
ity have held that fees may not be awarded.6 Courts have rea-
soned that the Rule's purpose, the discouragement of forum
shopping, will be furthered by the award of attorney's fees.7 One
recent decision awarding fees has argued that Rule 41(d) should
be construed in a manner consistent with Rule 41(a)(2), which
has been interpreted to allow a court to award attorney's fees to
the defendant upon granting a plaintiff a voluntary dismissal.8
Other courts awarding attorney's fees under Rule 41(d) have not
explained the bases for their rulings.9
This Article asserts that the Rule's text does not support an
award of attorney's fees and that the reasoning of the federal
district courts which have awarded such fees is inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent. Part I discusses the Supreme Court's
1996); see also Simeone v. First Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 971 F.2d 103, 108 (8th Cir. 1992)
(stating that "[closts awarded under Rule 41(d) ... are intended to serve as a deter-
rent to forum shopping and vexatious litigation"). For a detailed discussion on the
use of Rule 41 for forum shopping, see David J. Comeaux, Comment, Avoiding
Nonjudicious Nonsuits: Hearing the Defendant on Rule 41(a)(2) Motions, 32 Hous.
L. REV. 159 (1995).
' See Evans v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 623 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir. 1980) (affirming
fee award of $200 as within district court's discretion); Esquivel, 913 F. Supp. at
1388-92 (allowing attorney's fee award); Behrle v. Olshansky, 139 F.R.D. 370 (W.D.
Ark. 1991) (awarding same); Zucker v. Katz, No. 87 CIV. 7595, 1990 WL 20171, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 1990) (holding attorney's fees for court attendance in first action
were "clearly covered" because they could not be used in defense of second action);
Whitehead v. Miller Brewing Co., 126 F.R.D. 581, 582-83 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (allowing
fee award); Eager v. Kain, 158 F. Supp. 222, 223 (E.D. Tenn. 1957) (holding court
may require payment of costs, including attorney's fees of previous action, prior to
allowing filing of second action).
6 See Anders v. FPA Corp., 164 F.R.D. 383, 388-91 (D.N.J. 1995) (rejecting rea-
soning of Behrle and refusing to award attorney's fees under Rule 41(d)); Simeone,
125 F.R.D. at 155 (holding attorney's fees are not recoverable as "costs" under Rule
41(d)).
7 See Behrle, 139 F.R.D. at 372 (noting that term "costs" must include reason-
able attorney's fees to promote fairness in law); cf. Marlow v. Winston & Strawn,
No. 90 C 5715, 1994 WL 171437, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 1994) (supporting proposi-
tion that plaintiff seeking dismissal to obtain more favorable forum must bear con-
sequences of his strategic behavior).
" Esquivel, 913 F. Supp at 1391. The court also noted that the Rule is designed
to curb "indiscriminate and vexatious litigation." Id. The court reasoned that it
would be inconsistent to allow a court to have discretion to condition dismissal un-
der Rule 41(a)(2) on the payment of attorney's fees, but not to allow such discretion
under Rule 41(d). Id.
9 See Evans, 623 F.2d at 122; Whitehead, 126 F.R.D. at 582; Eager, 158 F. Supp.
at 223.
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RULE 41(d)
jurisprudence concerning whether a statute allows an award of
attorney's fees. Parts II and III analyze the text of Rule 41(d),
the interpretation of the term "costs," and the use of "costs" in
other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Part IV highlights the
policy considerations urged by the courts that award attorney's
fees under the Rule. Part V then analyzes the argument made
by one court that Rule 41(d) should be construed in the same
manner as Rule 41(a)(2). Finally, the Article concludes that
these policy considerations are overcome by sound principles of
statutory construction and Supreme Court precedent.
I. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON ATTORNEY'S FEES
Before analyzing the text of Rule 41(d), this Article will dis-
cuss recent Supreme Court decisions analyzing whether statutes
authorize awards of attorney's fees. These decisions make clear
that the general rule, known as "the American Rule," requires
that absent an express statutory authorization, a court may not
award attorney's fees.1"
A. Alyeska Pipeline
The leading decision concerning the issue of awarding attor-
ney's fees is Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness Soci-
ety." The lawsuit arose out of the discovery of a major oil field in
Alaska. 2 After the oil was discovered, oil companies applied for
permits to build a pipeline across Alaska to a seaport on the Pa-
cific Ocean." The plaintiff environmental groups sued the Secre-
'o The term "American Rule" highlights the differing rules in England and the
United States. The American Rule states that each party must bear the cost of his
or her own attorney's fees. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S.
240, 247 (1975); see also F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indust. Lumber Co.,
417 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1974) (stating that "reasonable expectations of such potential
litigants are better served by a rule of uniform national application"); Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973) (stating that although American Rule disfavors awarding attor-
ney's fees in absence of contract or statutory authority, courts may do so in interests
of justice under their equitable powers); Fleiscbmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (noting American Rule may be justified be-
cause penalty for losing would discourage poor persons from utilizing litigation to
secure their rights).
Underlying the American Rule is the notion that the law should fulfill the ex-
pectations of the litigating parties and that each party expects to bear his or her
own costs. See Anders, 164 F.R.D. 383.
" 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
12 Id. at 241.
"Id. at 242. Three oil companies combined to form the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
1997]
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tary of the Interior, arguing that the Secretary intended to issue
permits for the pipeline in violation of several federal statutes. 4
Plaintiffs initially obtained an injunction against the issuance of
the permits." Congress then passed a statute allowing the pipe-
line to proceed. 6 Plaintiffs next sought to recover their attor-
ney's fees on the ground that they had vindicated important
statutory rights. 7 Plaintiffs claimed that they were acting as a
"private attorney general." 8 The Court of Appeals agreed with
this reasoning and awarded attorney's fees to be paid by the de-
fendant pipeline company. 9
The Supreme Court reversed. ° The Court observed that un-
der "the American Rule" no attorney's fees are awarded to the
System which requested the right-of-way permits. Id. at 242 n.2. The application
requested a right-of-way of 54 feet for the pipeline, plus additional land for a road
and construction purposes. Id. at 242 n.3.
14 Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 242. The Wilderness Society, Environmental De-
fense Fund, and Friends of the Earth all brought the action for declaratory and in-
junctive relief, claiming that issuance of the permits would violate section 28 of the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as amended, and would be in violation of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Id. at 241-43.
" Id. at 243; see also Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422, 424 (D.C.
1970) (granting preliminary injunction after concluding width requested in permit
was excessive). A later decision which dissolved the preliminary injunction and
dismissed the action was reversed. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (en banc).
1" Congress amended the Mineral Leasing Act and passed the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act to allow the granting of permits, rendering the litigation
moot. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 244-45.
17 See Morton, 495 F.2d at 1032.
"a The Hall court held that fees could be awarded where a plaintiffs victory
"confers 'a substantial benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, and where
the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit makes possible an award
that will operate to spread the costs proportionately among them.' " Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973) (quoting Mills v. Electric Auto Light Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92
(1970). The reason for this exception was explained in Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d
852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972):
The violation of an important public policy may involve little by way of ac-
tual damages, so far as a single individual is concerned, or little in com-
parison with the cost of vindication, as the case at bar illustrates. If a de-
fendant may feel that the cost of litigation, and, particularly, that the
financial circumstances of an injured party may mean that the chances of
suit being brought, or continued in the face of opposition, will be small,
there will be little brake upon deliberate wrongdoing. In such instances
public policy may suggest an award of costs that will remove the burden
from the shoulders of the plaintiff seeking to vindicate the public right.
Id.
19 Morton, 495 F.2d at 1030-31.
2' Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 241.
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prevailing party in civil lawsuits.21 The Court noted that com-
mon law courts in England have been authorized to award attor-
ney's fees to the prevailing party since the Middle Ages." There
is an exception to the American Rule only where Congress has
passed a statute expressly authorizing the award of attorney's
fees.' The Court declined to create an exception to the rule for
plaintiffs vindicating a statutory right, because the creation of
such a right would usurp congressional authority.24
B. Key Tronic
A recent Supreme Court decision considered whether the
term "costs of response" in an environmental statute authorized
the recovery of attorney's fees. In Key Tronic Corp. v. United
States,25 the Court considered whether attorney's fees are "costs
of response" within the meaning of section 107 of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act ("CERCLA"). 5 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
commented: "Our cases establish that attorney's fees generally
are not a recoverable cost of litigation 'absent explicit congres-
sional authorization.' "27 The Court continued, "Recognition of
the availability of attorney's fees therefore requires a determi-
nation that 'Congress intended to set aside this long-standing
American rule of law.' "' The Court initially noted that neither
section 107 (liabilities and defenses) nor section 113
(contribution claims) "expressly mention[ed] the recovery of at-
torney's fees."" The Court made clear that there was no re-
21 Id. at 247. The opinion contains a detailed discussion of the history and devel-
opment of the "American Rule," noting the difference between the English system
and that of the United States. The debate over the benefits of each system has been
fueled in recent years by the Republican party's "Contract with America," which
proposed some changes toward that of the British system. See generally Joshua P.
Davis, Toward a Jurisprudence of Trial and Settlement: Allocating Attorney's Fees
by Amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, 48 ALA. L. REV. 65 (1996) (arguing
that attorney's fees should be awarded to winning parties based on amount offered
as pre-trial settlement).
Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 247-48 n.18.
23 Id. at 254-55.
24 Id. at 269-271.
2' 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
26 Key Tronic, 511 U.S. 814-19 (analyzing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)).
Id. at 814 (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185 (1976)).
Id. at 815 (quoting Runyon, 427 U.S. at 185-86).
29 Id.
19971
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quirement that the statute specifically refer to attorney's fees."
An award of fees may be authorized, even if not expressly pro-
vided for, "if the statute otherwise evinces an intent to provide
for such fees."31
The Key Tronic Court then analyzed whether the term
"necessary costs of response" in section 107 included attorney's
fees.32 The Court held that section 107 did not authorize an
award of attorney's fees for three reasons. First, section 107 did
not expressly authorize private suits for contribution from other
potentially responsible parties."3 Although the statute impliedly
authorized private suits against third parties, the Court refused
to read into the section a provision allowing the recovery of at-
torney's fees.34 Second, the Court noted that Congress included
two express provisions for the recovery of attorney's fees in
amendments to the CERCLA statute,35 without including a
similar provision in section 107 or section 113, which authorizes
contribution claims. The Court stated: "These omissions
strongly suggest a deliberate decision not to authorize such
awards."30  Third, the Court believed that the phrase
"enforcement activities" could not be read to encompass an
award of attorney's fees absent more explicit statutory guid-
ance.
37
C. Marek v. Chesny
In Marek v. Chesny,8 the Supreme Court analyzed whether
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorized an
30 Id.
3' Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 815.
32 Id. at 815-16.
33 Id. at 817.
' Id. at 818. The Court stated, "[t]o conclude that a provision that only im-
pliedly authorizes suit nonetheless provides for attorney's fees with the clarity re-
quired by Alyeska would be unusual if not unprecedented." Id.
' Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 818; see 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (1994) (allowing award of
"reasonable attorney and expert witness fees" to prevailing party); 42 U.S.C. § 9606
(b)(2)(E) (1994) (providing award of counsel fees in some circumstances to persons
erroneously ordered to pay response costs).
3' Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 818-19.
3' Id. at 820. The Court, however, found the work performed by attorneys in
identifying other responsible parties came within the scope of § 107(a)(4)(B), and
was therefore recoverable because non-lawyers could have performed it and the fees
were" 'not incurred in pursuing litigation.' "Id. (quoting FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus.,
998 F.2d 842, 847 (10th Cir. 1993)).
38 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
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award of attorney's fees in a civil rights case.39 In Marek, defen-
dant police officers responded to a domestic disturbance call.4"
When they arrived, the officers shot and killed plaintiffs adult
son.4 Plaintiff brought a section 1983 claim against the offi-
cers.42 Prior to trial, the defendants made a settlement offer of
$100,000 which plaintiff rejected.43
After trial, plaintiff was awarded $52,000 on the section
1983 claim.' Plaintiff subsequently filed a request for a sub-
stantial amount of costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988. 4 Section 1988 allows a plaintiff prevailing in a
suit pursuant to section 1983 to recover attorney's fees and
costs. 46 Defendants, however, argued that Rule 68, which shifts
to a plaintiff all" 'costs' incurred subsequent to an offer of judg-
ment not exceeded by the ultimate recovery at trial," barred
plaintiff's claim for costs. After noting that the Rule did not
define the term "costs," 48 the Court reasoned that the omission of
"attorney's fee's" within the definition of "costs" was intentional
and therefore concluded that the term "costs" referred to those
amounts that could be awarded pursuant to the underlying sub-
stantive statute.49 Consequently, the Court held that because
39 Id. at 3.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a right of suit where a citizen of the United States
has been deprived of his or her civil rights by one who acts under the color of state
law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
4' Marek, 473 U.S. at 3-4.
" Id. Plaintiff was also awarded $5,000 for his state law claim of wrongful death
and $3,000 in punitive damages, rendering a total award of $60,000. Id. at 4.
45 Id.
46 Section 1988(b) provides, in pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of section[] ... 1983 ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994).
47 Marek, 473 U.S. at 4. Rule 68 provides, in pertinent part: "If the judgment
finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must
pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer." FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
48 Marek, 473 U.S. at 8-9. The Court took notice that of the 35 statutes relating
to "costs" listed in the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 54(d), at least 11 included
attorney's fees as part of "costs." Id. The Court added "given the importance of
'costs' to [Rule 68], it is very unlikely that this omission was a mere oversight." Id.
at 9.
a9 Id. "The most reasonable inference is that the term 'costs' in Rule 68 was in-
tended to refer to all costs properly awardable under the relevant substantive stat-
ute or other authority." Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that lower
courts had also applied Rule 68 in accordance with the substantive law upon which
RULE 41(d)1997]
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the statute governing the litigation, section 1988,50 defined
"costs" to include attorney's fees, attorney's fees were subject to
the cost-shifting provision of Rule 68.51
The decision made clear that the recovery of costs depended
on the underlying statute.52 Thus the term "costs" in Rule 68
does not by itself authorize an award of attorney's fees.53 For in-
stance, in a breach of contract lawsuit based on diversity juris-
diction, the American Rule would be undisturbed and attorney's
fees would not be awarded under Rule 68.
II. THE TEXT OF RULE 41(d)
The text of Rule 41(d), which does not refer to "attorney's
fees," suggests that "costs" do not include "attorney's fees."54 The
Rule provides:
If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any court
commences an action based upon or including the same claim
against the same defendant, the court may make such order for
the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it
may deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action
the case itself rested. Id.; see also Fulps v. City of Springfield, 715 F.2d 1088, 1093
(6th Cir. 1983) (holding that Rule 68 "costs" included attorney's fees given definition
of costs in underlying statute included attorney's fees); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 485
F. Supp. 110, 113-15 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (holding same); Scheriffv. Beck, 452 F. Supp.
1254, 1259-60 (D. Colo. 1978).
50 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (stating provisions of 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b)).
" Marek, 473 U.S. at 9. For a discussion of Marek and Rule 68, see Peter Mar-
gulies, After Marek, the Deluge: Harmonizing the Interaction Under Rule 68 of Stat-
utes That Do and Do Not Classify Attorneys' Fees as "Costs", 73 IOWA L. REV. 413
(1988); Roger Platt, Note, Settle or Else -Federal Rule 68 Makes Civil Rights Litiga-
tion a Risky Business: Marek v. Chesny, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 535 (1987); Gale C. Shu-
maker, Casenote, Marek v. Chesny: Civil Rights Attorney's Fees and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 68: The Conflict Resolved, 12 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 287 (1985).
52 The Court stated: "[Aibsent congressional expressions to the contrary, where
the underlying statute defines 'costs' to include attorney's fees, we are satisfied such
fees are to be included as costs for purposes of Rule 68." Marek, 473 U.S. at 9.
5 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
In prefacing its determination in Marek with an overview of federal statutes
relating to "costs," the Supreme Court noted that exclusion from a statute of any
mention of attorney's fees bears significantly on the determination of whether the
award of such fees was intended. Marek, 473 U.S. at 8-9. Additionally, in light of the
long standing American rule of law which requires that each party pay their own
litigation expenses, the Court has historically expressed hesitance to depart from
this rule absent explicit congressional authority. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,
511 U.S. 809, 815 (1994); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185 (1976); Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
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until the plaintiff has complied with the order."'
The Rule refers to, but does not define, what constitutes
"costs." Neither the Rule nor the Advisory Committee Notes
mention "attorney's fees."56 Providing some insight as to the
scope of costs, 28 U.S.C. § 1920 sets forth the items that may be
taxed as costs." Section 1920 allows recovery of fees of the clerk,
the court reporter, witnesses, and printing costs but does not al-
low the recovery of attorney's fees.58
Because neither Rule 68 nor Rule 41(d) use the term "costs,"
and do not mention the term "attorney's fees," one may argue
that the term should have the same meaning under both rules.
Accepting this proposition, it follows that the holding in Marek,
excluding attorney's fees from "costs" recoverable under Rule 68,
should also extend to costs recoverable under Rule 41(d). As the
Supreme Court indicated in Key Tronic, however, the absence of
specific reference to attorney's fees is not dispositive.59
III. THE TEXT OF OTHER FEDERAL RULES
Under a comparative plain meaning analysis, the text of
other federal rules strongly suggests that Rule 41(d) does not
authorize an award of attorney's fees. Several federal rules ex-
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(d).
5 See FED. R. CIV. P. 41 advisory committee's note.
57 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1994). Section 1920 provides:
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the fol-
lowing:
(1) Fees of the clerk and Marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic
transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained
for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of inter-
preters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpreta-
tion services under section 1828 of this title.
A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the
judgment or decree.
Id.
53 See Smoot v. Fox, 353 F.2d 830, 832 (6th Cir. 1965) (holding that attorney's
fees are not includable in "costs" because not defined in Rule 68 or Section 1920);
Anders v. FPA Corp., 164 F.R.D. 383, 390-391 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding same); Kramer
v. Jarvis, 86 F. Supp. 743, 744 (D. Neb. 1949) (finding same).
r9 Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 815.
1997] RULE 41(d)
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pressly provide for the recovery of attorney's fees.60 For example,
Rule 37(c)(1) provides for sanctions when a party fails to disclose
information required to be disclosed by Rule 26 and allows a
party to recover "reasonable expenses," including "attorney's
fees."6' The text of the other federal rules allowing the recovery
of "attorney's fees" suggests that their drafters understood the
difference between "costs" and "attorney's fees" and intended to
distinguish between the two forms of relief. It is logical to con-
clude, therefore, that had they wanted to allow the award of at-
torney's fees under Rule 41(d), they would have included the
term "attorney's fees" in the text of the rule. Using similar logic,
the Court in Key Tronic noted that other provisions of the
CERCLA statute expressly allowed the recovery of attorney's
fees while the provision at issue in Key Tronic did not.62 The
Court therefore reasoned that the failure to mention attorney's
fees indicated "a deliberate decision not to authorize such
awards."63 Thus Rule 41(d)'s text, when compared with the texts
of other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with other federal
statutes, strongly indicates that the drafters intended only to
authorize awards of costs, not attorney's fees."
'0 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (allowing recovery of "some or all of the reasonable
attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation" of
Rule 11); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3) (allowing recovery of "reasonable expenses in-
curred because of the violation [of Rule 26], including a reasonable attorney's fee");
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(g)(2) (allowing court to award "reasonable expenses ... including
reasonable attorney's fees" for failure to attend or serve subpoena); FED. R. CIv. P.
37(a)(4)(A) & (B) (allowing court to award reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees, incurred in making or opposing motion to compel discovery); FED. R. CIV P.
37(c)(1) (allowing recovery of "reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees" for
failure to disclose information required by Rule 26(a)); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(2)
(allowing recovery of "reasonable expenses ... including attorney's fees" for failure to
comply with Rule 36 request); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d) (allowing recovery of"reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees" for failure to respond to request for inspection);
FED. R. CiV. P. 56(g) (allowing recovery of "reasonable expenses ... including rea-
sonable attorney's fees" for presenting affidavit made in bad faith).
6'1 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); see supra note 60 (discussing relevant portion of Rule
37(c)(1)).
62 Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 816-17.
Id. at 819; see also Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (noting omission of
"attorney's fees" from text of Rule 68 was relevant in light of inclusion of term in
other federal statutes).
Applying this interpretation of Rule 41(d), the District Court of Minnesota, in
Simeone v. First Bank National Association, 125 F.R.D. 150, 155 (D. Minn. 1989),
rev'd on other grounds, 971 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1992), denied a defendant's request
for attorney's fees. The Simeone court recognized that the language of Rule 41(d)
"speaks only generally of payment of 'costs' and does not specifically mention attor-
RULE 41(d)
The use of the term "reasonable expenses" in several of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such as Rule 37(d),65 indicates
that the drafters understood the difference between the
"expenses" allowed by the Rules and the term "costs" as used in
28 U.S.C. § 1920.66 For example, if one party fails to disclose in-
formation required to be disclosed by the Rules, the other party
may incur various "expenses" to obtain the information. An ex-
ample of such an "expense" is the cost of travel to a city to take a
deposition for the second time. Such an expenditure would not
be recoverable as a "cost" under section 1920.6' The drafters
neys' fees." Id. Additionally, the court noted that other Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure explicitly provide for the recovery of attorney's fees. Id. The court pointed out
that only a few cases had addressed the issue of attorney's fees under Rule 41(d)
and results varied. Id. at 155. Compare Evans v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 623 F.2d 121,
122 (8th Cir. 1980) (awarding attorney's fees) and Eager v. Kain, 158 F. Supp. 222,
223 (E.D. Tenn. 1957) (awarding same), with Yetter Homes, Inc. v. Coastal Cabinet
Works, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 568, 572 (E.D.S.C. 1964) (refusing to award attorney's
fees). After noting that such an award was typically the exception to the rule, the
Simeone court found that absent clear intent to provide for such, attorney's fees
were not recoverable under Rule 41(d). Simeone, 125 F.R.D. at 155.
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d) (allowing recovery of "reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees").
'; See supra notes 57 and 60. Compare 28 U.S.C § 1920 (1994), with FED. R. Civ.
P. 11(c)(2), 26(g)(3), 30(g)(2), 37(a)(4)(A), 37(c)(I)&(2), 37(d), 56(g). Inclusion of fees
for the items within the statute is at the discretion of the court, but a court must be
conservative when awarding expenses not specifically allowed by statute. See
Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964); Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d
284, 287 (5th Cir. 1977). Only attorney services listed in the statute can be taxed.
See The Baltimore, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 377, 392 (1869); Grant v. Fletcher, 283 F. 243,
274 (E.D. Mich. 1922) (stating that special or extra allowances are not recoverable
absent specific statutory authority). Federal courts are not free to create new rules
regarding attorney's fees. Anderson v. Thompson, 495 F. Supp. 1256, 1269 (E.D.
Wis. 1980), affd, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981).
67 The term "cost" has been given a strict statutory interpretation. See, e.g.,
Daniel D. Mason, Note, Hosner v. The Gibson Partner Warning: "Free" Dismissals
Under 41(A)(1)(a) Can Really Cost, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 233, 236 (1990) (discussing
early Ohio Supreme Court decisions stating term "costs" should be given strict in-
terpretation to cover only expenses authorized by statute). Over time, however,
some courts have departed from this strict construction with regard to Rule 41(d).
See id. at 243. A broader reading of the term "costs" reflects a policy concern that
dismissal of a case is an unnecessary expense to the opposing party and disrupts the
court's calendar, and that such actions must be deterred by an award of attorney's
fees. Id.; see also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Rodgers, 882 P.2d 1037, 1041
(Mont. 1994) (stating power to award attorney's fees pursuant to rule 41(d) exists in
court where second action is commenced).
Notwithstanding the broad reading sometimes given to the term "costs," travel
expenses of an attorney for taking a deposition are ordinarily not recoverable as a
"cost." See Wahl v. Carrier Mfg. Co., 511 F.2d 209, 217 (7th Cir. 1975); Kiefel v. Las
Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1968); Apostal v. City of Crystal Lake,
165 F.R.D. 508, 513 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
1997]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
carefully chose the term "expenses" instead of "costs" or
"attorney's fees," indicating that these three words have distinct
meanings.
IV. THE POLICY BEHIND RULE 41(d)
Courts have often awarded attorney's fees in order to foster
Rule 41(d)'s policy against forum shopping. The Rule is designed
to prevent a plaintiff from filing a case in one jurisdiction, dis-
missing the case and filing the same case in another jurisdiction.
In Behrle v. Olshansky,68 the court, in order to ensure that Rule
41(d) had "teeth," awarded attorney's fees to the defendant.69 In
Behrle, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Arkansas state court alleging
that defendant had defrauded him in connection with the sale of
a business. ° After remaining in state court for eight years, the
case finally came to trial.71 After only three days of trial, the
plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case.72 One day later, plaintiff
filed an identical lawsuit in federal court.7" The court critically
stated: "[W]e have a lawsuit in this court in which the parties
are exactly where they were more than eight years ago. In this
court's view, there is obviously something wrong with that."4
Addressing the issue of attorney's fees, the Behrle court con-
cluded that if Rule 41(d) only permitted the recovery of costs al-
lowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, then the provision would have no
"teeth" and be rendered useless.75 The court reasoned that Con-
139 F.R.D. 370 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
69 Id. at 374.
70 Id. at 371. Plaintiff alleged that defendant intentionally made false represen-
tations of material facts during and after his purchase of plaintiffs controlling in-
terest in a corporation. Id.
71 Id. at 371.
72 Behrle, 139 F.R.D. at 371. Plaintiff nonsuited the case as a matter of right,
pursuant to Rule 41 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
73 Id. By that time, defendant had already spent $141,000 for attorney's fees. Id.
74 Id. at 371. The general purpose of Rule 41 was to remedy such situations. The
Rule establishes the point at which the court's and the defendant's resources are so
committed that a dismissal without a penalty to the plaintiff would be unjust. See
Safegaurd Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Hoeffel, 907 F.2d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that
Rule 41 provides for plaintiff who loses privilege of dismissal as matter of right be-
cause answer or motion for summary judgment filed); In re Piper Aircraft Distrib.
Sys. Antitrust Litig., 551 F.2d 213, 220 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding same).
75 Behrle, 139 F.R.D. at 373. While the Behrle court concluded that attorney's
fees should be permitted because the text of Rule 41(d) allows a court to make an
order for the payment of costs "as it may deem proper," it is similarly plausible that
"the phrase 'as it may deem proper' refers to the court's discretion in its initial deci-
sion whether to award costs or not; [and] it does not necessarily provide discretion
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gress must have intended for the Rule to have "teeth" and
awarded attorney's fees.76
There can be no question that the Rule's policy against fo-
rum shopping would be furthered by awarding attorney's fees to
the defendant. A cost award, comprised of only court and other
incidental costs, is often insubstantial. Attorney's fees, however,
comprise a majority of the expenses in defending a lawsuit.77 Al-
though the drafters of Rule 41(d) were almost certainly aware
that awarding attorney's fees would serve the policy considera-
tions of the Rule, they did not use that term in the Rule's text.
Where the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did
intend that courts award attorney's fees, they expressly referred
to awards of "attorney's fees."" The remedial provisions of many
federal rules would be strengthened by awarding attorney's fees
to prevailing parties. The drafters of Rule 41(d) were presuma-
bly aware of this when they drafted the Rule. Yet, they used the
term "costs" rather than "attorney's fees."
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society79 is in-
structive in this context. In Alyeska Pipeline, the plaintiff envi-
ronmental groups argued that they should be entitled to attor-
ney's fees because they performed the function of a "private
attorney general."" They claimed to have vindicated important
to determine whether attorney's fees may be included in an award of costs." Anders
v. F.P.A. Co., 164 F.R.D. 383, 390 (D.N.J. 1995).
76 Behrle, 139 F.R.D. at 373. The Behrle court "believe[d] and [found] that Con-
gress must have intended when Rule 41(d) was adopted to give the court discretion
to include reasonable attorney's fees in the 'costs' that could be imposed." Id. at 374;
see also Esquivel v. Arau, 913 F. Supp. 1382, 1391 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (basing its award
of attorney's fees, in part, on fact that Rule was designed to curb "indiscriminate
and vexatious litigation"). Additionally, the Esquivel court wanted to discourage
needless expenses to defending parties. Esquivel, 913 F. Supp. at 1391. The court
believed that it must have the discretion to award attorney's fees under circum-
stances of a voluntary dismissal to ensure fairness to the litigants. Id.
See Craig Madison Patrick, The Offer You Can't Refuse: Offers of Judgment in
the Eastern District of Texas, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 1075, 1080 (1994) (noting that at-
torney's fees are major component of actual costs of lawsuit). See generally ROBERT
L. Rossi, ATrORNEYS' FEES § 10:21 (2d ed. 1995) (supplying overview of attorneys'
fees recovered by defendants in federal court).
78 FED. R. CIV P. 37(a)(4). Rule 37 imposes the penalty of attorney's fees on a
party who fails to attend a deposition or serve answers to interrogatories. Id. For a
discussion of sanctions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Gregory P. Jo-
seph, Emerging Expert Issues Under the 1993 Disclosure Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 164 F.R.D. 97 (1996).
7- 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
8 Id. at 241. The environmental groups initiated litigation to prevent the Secre-
tary of Interior from issuing permits required for construction of the trans-Alaska
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statutory rights, which benefited the public interest.81 They ar-
gued that policy considerations strongly supported an award of
attorney's fees.8" The Court agreed that this policy might have
merit: "It is ... apparent from our national experience that the
encouragement of private action to implement public policy has
been viewed as desirable in a variety of circumstances."' This
policy reason, however, did not persuade the Court to depart
from the American Rule, which is "deeply rooted in our history
and in congressional policy."" The Alyeska Pipeline Court pos-
ited that policy alone cannot justify a departure from the Ameri-
can Rule. Such reasoning also applies to Rule 41(d).
V. THE ARGUMENT BASED ON RULE 41(a)(2)
In Esquivel v. Arau,85 the District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California looked to decisions awarding attorney's fees
under Rule 41(a)(2) for guidance in determining whether the
same construction should be accorded Rule 41(d). In Esquivel,
the court reasoned that Rule 41(d) permitted an award of fees
because Rule 41(a)(2), which governs voluntary dismissals, has
been read to allow the imposition of attorney's fees as a condition
of dismissal. 6 The Esquivel court found that it would be
anomalous to hold that fees may be awarded as a condition of the
voluntary dismissal of the first case, but that they could not be
awarded upon the refiling of the case in another jurisdiction.
Rule 41(a)(2) provides that "an action shall not be dismissed
at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems proper."87 Courts
have held that this language allows the trial judge to condition a
oil pipeline. Id.; see supra notes 11-24 and accompanying text.
8' Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 245.
"Id. These policy considerations include: (a) ensuring the governmental system
functions properly; and (b) encouraging private parties to initiate litigation to en-
sure that environmental laws are properly enforced. Id. at 246.
Id. at 271; see also Andrew D. Dorisio & Jacqueline Kerry Heyman, Key
Tronic v. United States: The Buck Stops Here, 10 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. LAW
125, 128 (1995) (maintaining that encouragement of private action in pursuit of
public policy has often been viewed favorably by courts).
"Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 262. The Court stated, "the circumstances under
which attorney's fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in
making those awards are matters for Congress to determine." Id.
'8 913 F. Supp. 1382 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
See id. at 1388 (asserting that when purpose of awarding fees is similar, stan-
dard for expenses awarded should be same for both rules).
87 FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2).
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voluntary dismissal upon the payment of the defendant's attor-
ney's fees.' In theory, the Rule gives the court the power to ne-
gotiate with the plaintiff. If the plaintiff does not agree with the
court's terms for dismissal, the plaintiff may decide not to dis-
miss the action. 9 The Esquivel court relied on the above inter-
pretation to argue that attorney's fees should also be authorized
by Rule 41(d)." The Esquivel court explained that it would be
inconsistent for a court to award fees as a condition of a volun-
tary dismissal but not to allow an award of fees when a case that
was previously voluntarily dismissed is refiled.91
There are two significant problems with this argument.
First, the text of Rule 41(a)(2) does not expressly authorize an
award of attorney's fees. The language "upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper" 2 is too ambiguous; it does
not suggest whether an award of fees is authorized. Under Aly-
eska Pipeline and Key Tronic, an argument can be made that
Congress' failure to expressly authorize an award of attorney's
fees preserves the American Rule, which does not award attor-
ney's fees. In addition, the Notes of the Advisory Committee do
not suggest that attorney's fees can be awarded under Rule
41(a)(2). 3 Thus, it is unclear whether Rule 41(a)(2) authorizes
courts to award attorney's fees as a condition of a voluntary
dismissal.
es See, e.g., Cauley v. Wilson, 754 F.2d 769, 771 (7th Cir. 1985) (declaring that
Rule 41(a)(2) permits court to condition voluntary dismissal without prejudice on
payment of defendants attorney's fees). An appeal of the conditions imposed on a
dismissal is only permissible if the conditions, such as attorney's fees, were prejudi-
cial to the plaintiff. Id. The purpose of the award is to compensate the defendant for
the monetary loss caused by the discontinued litigation. Id. at 772; see also Koch v.
Hankins, 8 F.3d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that proof of attorney's fees must
differentiate between cost of work product rendered unusable by dismissal and work
product which can be used in later litigation).
69 See White v. Telelect, Inc., 109 F.R.D. 655, 656 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (explaining
that, in requesting voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), plaintiff can ei-
ther pay costs and accept dismissal or decline to pay costs and continue action).
913 F. Supp. at 1391. According to the court, "[t]he fact that Rule 41(a)(2) has
been a basis to impose fee award 'conditions' lends support to the proposition that
Rule 41(d) 'costs' awards should also include attorneys' fees." Id.
9' See id.
92 FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
93 The advisory committee notes deal exclusively with procedure, specifically
with procedure under Rule 41(a)(1). There is no expression of legislative intent re-
garding attorney's fees. The sole reference to Rule 41(a)(2) is an explanation that
the Rule can provide a voluntary dismissal in the event that the court denies a mo-
tion for a directed verdict. FED. R. CIV. P. 41 advisory committee's note.
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The second problem with this argument is that the phrase
"upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper" in
Rule 41(a)(2), suggests that it operates differently than Rule
41(d).94 The former contemplates a negotiation between the
plaintiff and the court. During the negotiation, the court may
allow defendants to recover their attorney's fees if the plaintiff
seeks a voluntary dismissal. If the court indicates that it will
award attorney's fees upon a voluntary dismissal, the plaintiff
can decide to proceed with the litigation.95 Thus, Rule 41(a)(2)
contemplates that the decision of whether to award attorney's
fees will be a product of a bargain between well-informed parties.
Not only does a plaintiff lack such bargaining power in the con-
text of Rule 41(d), but Rule 41(d) also does not contemplate a ne-
gotiation between the parties and the court. Rule 41(d) simply
refers to "costs." This suggests that Rule 41(a)(2) was meant to
operate differently from Rule 41(d) and that the drafters inten-
tionally used different language in the two rules to highlight the
difference in their operation. Thus, it is not anomalous to allow
an award of fees under Rule 41(a)(2) while not allowing the same
under Rule 41(d). The drafters intended that the two rules
would operate differently.
CONCLUSION
Several courts have awarded attorney's fees pursuant to
Rule 41(d). They have based their decisions on the Rule's policy
against forum shopping and on the trend to allow the recovery of
attorney's fees under Rule 41(a)(2). Certainly, the Rule's policy
against forum shopping would be furthered by awarding attor-
ney's fees, since dismissing cases would be more expensive for
plaintiffs. The Rule's text, however, only mentions "costs," while
other federal rules specifically mention "attorney's fees." The
difference in terminology suggests that the drafters recognized
the marked distinction between "costs" and "attorney's fees."
The comparison of Rule 41(d) with Rule 41(a)(2) does not
suggest that Rule 41(d) authorizes an award of attorney's fees.
First, it is unclear whether the text of Rule 41(a)(2) authorizes
94Mason, supra note 67, at 249 ("It was not the intent of the drafters to make
the two rules identical.").
9' White v. Telelect, Inc., 109 F.R.D. 655, 656 (S.D. Miss. 1986). The White court
permitted a plaintiff to proceed with his case instead of following through with the
dismissal to avoid payment of attorney's fees to the defendant. Id.
[Vol.71:81
19971 RULE 41(d) 97
an award of attorney's fees. Second, the drafters used one term
in Rule 41(d) and another in Rule 41(a)(2). The meticulous
choice of words suggests that the drafters intended the two rules
to operate differently. Consequently, the most reasonable con-
clusion is that the drafters of Rule 41(d) intended only to
authorize awards of costs, not attorney's fees.

